Punitive Damages in Defamation Actions: An Area of Libel Law Worth Reforming by Casarez, Nicole B.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 32 Number 4 Article 3 
1994 
Punitive Damages in Defamation Actions: An Area of Libel Law 
Worth Reforming 
Nicole B. Casarez 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nicole B. Casarez, Punitive Damages in Defamation Actions: An Area of Libel Law Worth Reforming, 32 
Duq. L. Rev. 667 (1994). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol32/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Duquesne Law Review
Volume 32, Summer 1994, Number 4
Punitive Damages in Defamation Actions: An Area
of Libel Law Worth Reforming
Nicole B. Cdsarez*
I. INTRODUCTION
Libel law in America is complex, confusing, expensive, unwork-
able and ultimately inefficient. Although the U.S. Supreme Court's
enunciation of the actual malice rule in New York Times v. Sulli-
van' initially drew acclaim, ' thirty years later many commentators
appear ready to scrap the doctrine and begin anew.3 Various pro-
posals for libel reform have been offered, including both compre-
hensive and piecemeal approaches.4 Professor David Anderson, a
* Assistant Professor, University of St. Thomas, Department of Communication.
B.J., University of Texas, 1976; J.D., University of Texas, 1979; M.A., University of Hous-
ton, 1991.
I am grateful to Professor Peter Linzer, University of Houston School of Law, for review-
ing and commenting on this article.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. See e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 S. CT. REv. 191.
3. See Lois G. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND
INVASION OF PRIVACY ACTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987); David A. Anderson, Is Libel
Law Worth Reforming? 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1991); Richard A. Epstein, Was New York
Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782 (1986); Sheldon W. Halpern, Values and
Value: An Essay on Libel Reform, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227 (1990); Scott M. Matheson,
Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First Amendment, 66
TEX. L. REV. 215 (1987); L. A. Powe, Jr., Mass Communications and the First Amendment:
An Overview, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. 53 (1992).
4. See Marc A. Franklin, The Financial Impact of Libel Reform on Repeat Players,
in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 171 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M.
Noam eds., 1989) for a discussion of three reform proposals: the Lockyer Bill, the Schumer
Bill, and the Plaintiffs Option Libel Reform Act. See also, THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON
PROGRAM. PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAW (1988); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory
Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L. REV. 809 (1986); Pierre N. Leval,
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noted expert in the field, has concluded that the inadequacies of
our current libel system render it unsalvageable.' In Anderson's
opinion, only the Supreme Court can successfully undertake the
kind of drastic reworking of libel law necessary to provide mean-
ingful protection to both reputational and speech interests.
6
Meanwhile, however, jury awards in defamation actions continue
to escalate alarmingly. According to data gathered by the Libel De-
fense Resource Center ("LDRC"),7 the median jury award in libel
and other communication tort trials has increased from $200,000 in
the 1980s to $1.5 million for 1990 and 1991.8 Furthermore, punitive
damages were included in more than three-quarters of the 1990-91
damage awards, with the median punitive award totalling $2.5 mil-
lion-compared to a median punitive award of $200,000 in the
1980s.1 The study also revealed that in the 1980s, only about
twenty-five percent of the initial jury and bench awards were ulti-
mately affirmed as entered; the remaining seventy-five percent
were reduced or overturned to the benefit of the libel defendant. 10
These statistics show juries granting large awards, usually in-
cluding a punitive component, that are often overturned post trial
or on appeal. The increasing size of jury awards is hard to reconcile
with the Iowa Libel Research Project's ("ILRP") conclusion that
most libel plaintiffs bring suit not to receive money damages, but
rather to clear the air and re-establish their reputations.11 Our pre-
sent system of assessing damages in defamation actions appears to
be an expensive exercise in futility. If juries continue to bestow
The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in its Proper Place, 101 HARv. L.
REV. 1287 (1988).
In August 1993, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ap-
proved the Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act. Under that proposal, a
libel plaintiff would be entitled to recover only provable economic loss if the defendant
publishes an adequate correction or clarification within 45 days of the plaintiff's request.
See Kenneth Jost, Model Libel Law Proposed, 79 A.B.A. J. 32 (Nov. 1993). For the complete
text of the UCCDA, see Debra Gersh, Reviled Proposal Toned Down, EDITOR & PUBLISHER
12-15 (Sept. 4, 1993).
5. Anderson, cited at note 3.
6. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 552-54.
7. The Libel Defense Resource Center is a non-profit media clearinghouse for infor-
mation on libel developments.
8. Trial Results, Damage Awards and Appeals, 1980-89 and 1990-91: The "Chilling
Effect" Writ Large ... Then Writ Larger, LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, LDRC RECAP
AND UPDATE: Special Issue B, July 31, 1992, at 3-5.
9. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, cited at note 8, at 3-5.
10. Id.
11. Randall P. Bezanson et al., The Economics of Libel: An Empirical Assessment,
in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, cited at note 4, at 33.
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libel damages at the same rate they did during 1990 and 1991, the
LDRC has estimated that over one billion dollars in judgments
could be assessed against the media by the end of the decade.
1 2
Given the size of the LDRC figures, should these excessive jury
verdicts be ignored while we wait for the Supreme Court to rewrite
the law of libel? Even before Sullivan was decided in 1964, com-
mentators called for restrictions on or the elimination of punitive
damages in libel actions."3 Others view punitive damages as the
last hope of already outgunned libel plaintiffs, who languish in a
system that favors speech, and a powerful press, too much over
individual reputations.
14
The objective of this article is to reconsider the wisdom of
awarding punitive damages in libel actions. It will briefly discuss
the history and function of punitive damages, review the Supreme
Court's treatment of punitive damages in defamation and other
tort actions, review the arguments both for and against eliminating
punitive damages in libel law, and analyze suggested limitations on
punitive damages. Finally, this article will take the position that
punitive damages should be eliminated in public plaintiff libel and
certain related communication tort cases. However, this conclusion
should not be seen as an attempt to solve libel's many woes, but
rather as a worthwhile stop-gap measure to implement while wait-
ing for more comprehensive libel law reform.
II. HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages have a long history dating back as far as the
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (1792-1750 B.C.). 5 Reference to
punitive-type damages, damages above that necessary for compen-
sation, also appear in the Hittite Law (1400 B.C.), Hebrew Mosaic
Law (1200 B.C.), the Roman Law of Twelve Tables (450 B.C.), and
12. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, cited at note 8, at 5.
13. See Note, Punitive Damages in Defamation Litigation: A Clear and Present
Danger to Freedom of Speech, 64 YALE L.J. 610 (1955); P. Cameron DeVore & Marshall J.
Nelson, Punitive Damages in Libel Cases After Browning-Ferris, 12 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 153 (1989); William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery
From the Press-An Extended Comment on "The Anderson Solution", 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 793 (1984); Comment, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 847 (1985);
Nicholas Jollymore, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damage's in Libel Actions, 45 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1382 (1977).
14. See Jerome A. Barron, Punitive Damages in Libel Cases-First Amendment
Equalizer?, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 105 (1990); Anderson, cited at note 3, at 542.
15. LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN. PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 1.0 (2d ed.
1989). Hammurabi was the king of Babylonia in the first dynasty, believed to have reigned
in the 18th century B.C. RANDOM HOUSE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2258 (3d ed. 1990).
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the Hindu Code of Manu (200 B.C.)."6 In 1763, an English court
used the phrase "exemplary damages" when it upheld a jury award
of three hundred pounds in an action for trespass and false impris-
onment where the plaintiff's actual damages totalled just twenty
pounds.1"
Three major theories explain why the doctrine of punitive dam-
ages developed. The first revolves around the ability of English lit-
igants to hold jury members accountable for awarding excessive
verdicts. Early English appellate courts lacked power to review or
reduce such verdicts, but the aggrieved party could proceed di-
rectly against jury members by using a writ of attaint.18 To justify
large jury awards and thereby avoid punishing local jurors, English
courts recognized a punitive function of damage awards. 9 How-
ever, this rationale for punitive damages became irrelevant as
courts began to exercise control over the size of monetary
judgments. 0
The second theory surmises that courts allowed punitive dam-
ages to recompense plaintiffs for varieties of mental suffering at a
time when such injuries were not recognized by the common law.2"
For example, in Tullidge v. Wade,22 the court awarded punitive
damages against the defendant in a seduction action to redress the
plaintiff's affronted honor. Once again, this compensatory role of
punitive damages has no significance in current law. Most jurisdic-
tions now allow actual damages to be awarded for all types of
mental anguish, emotional suffering and related intangible
harms.
23
Finally, punitive damages have been justified as a socially bene-
16. See generally, SCHLUETER & REDDEN, cited at note 15, §§ 1.1-1.2; David G. Owen,
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1262-63 n. 17
(1976); James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Out-
lived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1984).
17. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
18. SCHLEUTER & REDDEN, cited at note 15, §1.3(B); Sales & Cole, cited at note 16, at
1120-1121 at n. 12.
19. Sales & Cole, cited at note 16, at 1120-21.
20. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, cited at note 15, § 1.3(B); Sales & Cole, cited at note 16,
at 1120-21.
21. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, cited at note 15, §§ 1.3(C}-1.3(D); Sales & Cole, cited at
note 16, at 1121.
22. 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1769).
23. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, cited at note 15, § 1.4(B); Sales & Cole, cited at note 16,
at 1122. See also, Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 364 N.W.2d 600 (Mich. 1984). In Michigan,
"exemplary damages" are purely compensatory in nature and may be awarded for injury to
feeling if not duplicative of actual damages. Id.
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ficial means to penalize and prevent quasi-criminal activity.24 Pu-
nitive damages are awarded to punish serious, harmful tortious
conduct that falls outside of the parameters of the criminal law,
and to discourage future misconduct.25 Most American courts to-
day advance this dichotomy of punishment and deterrence to sup-
port the doctrine of punitive damages.2 However, both judges and
commentators have criticized this rationale, objecting that com-
pensation is the proper goal of the civil law system, and that pun-
ishment and deterrence are more appropriately left to the criminal
law system.27
Despite these objections, most American jurisdictions recognize
punitive damages as part of the common law. A minority of states
have abolished punitive damages in all civil cases,28 or allow them
only when authorized by statute.29 Additionally, several states ap-
ply the doctrine in such a way that any punitive award is in es-
sence compensatory in nature.
30
Recent developments in tort law have heightened the contro-
versy over punitive damages and have drawn the attention of the
24. See e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), where the Supreme
Court described punitive awards as "private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensi-
ble conduct and to deter its future occurrence." Id. at 350.
25. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, cited at note 15, § 1.4(B); Sales & Cole, cited at note 16,
at 1123. Some courts have suggested that punitive damages provide necessary financial in-
centive for tort victims to bring suit to enforce their rights. Sales & Cole, cited at note 16, at
1123. See also the text accompanying notes 195-207.
26. Sales & Cole, cited at note 16, at 1126.
27. DeVore & Nelson, cited at note 13, at 169; Jeffery W. Grass, The Penal Dimen-
sions of Punitive Damages, 12 HAST'INGS CONST. L.Q. 241, 241 (1985); Sales & Cole, cited at
note 16, at 1123-24. See also, Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873). ("The idea is wrong. It
is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the sym-
metry of the body of the law.")
28. See, e.g., Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb. 1975). Nebraska follows
this rule. Additionally, Oregon has eliminated punitive recoveries in defamation cases pur-
suant to its state constitution. Wheeler v. Green, 593 P.2d 777, 788-89 (Or. 1979).
29. See, e.g., Killebrew v. Abbott Lab., 359 So.2d 1275, 1278 (La. 1978); Flesner v.
Technical Communications Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107, 1112 (Mass. 1991); Maki v. Aluminum
Building Prods., 436 P.2d 186, 187 (Wash. 1968). But, Washington has judicially abolished
punitive damages in libel cases. See Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 546 P.2d 81, 86
(Wash. 1976).
30. These jurisdictions include Connecticut, Michigan and New Hampshire. See, e.g.,
Venturi v. Savitt, Inc., 468 A.2d 933, 935 (Conn. 1983) (punitive damages limited to com-
pensation for litigation expenses, less taxable costs); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 364 N.W.
2d 600 (Mich. 1984) ("exemplary damages" are purely compensatory in nature and may be
awarded for injury to feeling if not duplicative of actual damages); Vratsenes v. New Hamp-
shire Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 68 (N.H. 1972) (although punitive damages are not allowed,
compensatory damages may reflect the egregious nature of the defendant's wanton, mali-
cious or oppressive conduct).
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Supreme Court. Beginning in the late 1970s, juries began awarding
punitive damages more often, in greater amounts, and in a wider
variety of cases than in the past.31 Commentators attacked the un-
limited and standardless discretion exercised by juries in granting
punitive damages, and questioned the fairness and constitutional-
ity of the doctrine.2
By the mid-1980s, the Court had recognized that constitutional
challenges to punitive damages raised "important issues"; 3 how-
ever, the Court resolved the first two eases to present these issues
on other grounds. 4 But foes of punitive damages were heartened
by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Bankers Life & Casu-
alty Co. v. Crenshaw.3 5 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia,
noted that giving a jury "wholly standardless discretion to deter-
mine the severity of punishment appears inconsistent with due
process."3"
The Court first considered the merits of a constitutional objec-
tion to punitive damages in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco
Disposal." That case considered whether a $6,000,000 punitive
award in an antitrust case constituted an excessive fine prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment.3 8 In an opinion that provided a histori-
cal analysis of the origins of the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court
31. Theodore B. Olson & Theodore J. Boutrous Jr., Constitutional Restraints on the
Doctrine of Punitive Damages, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 907, 908 (1990); Sales & Cole, cited at note
16, at 1154 and n. 167; William H. Volz & Michael C. Fayz, Punitive Damages and the Due
Process Clause: The Search for Constitutional Standards, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 459,
462-63 and n. 17. (1992). But see, Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in
Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 43 (1990), where the authors concluded that punitive
damages are awarded infrequently and in modest amounts. However, their findings also re-
vealed that successful plaintiffs were least likely to receive a punitive damage award in cases
involving physical injury, and most likely to receive a punitive damage recovery in an emo-
tional/reputational harm case. Id. at 38-39.
32. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 33-63 (1983); Olson & Boutrous, cited at note 31, at 930;
Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Magarian, Challenging the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages: Putting Rules of Reason on an Unbounded Legal Remedy, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 485,
495-97 (1990); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Dam-
ages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 309 (1983).
33. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986).
34. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 827-29 (state court justice's failure to recuse himself resulted
in a violation of the due process clause); Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S.
71, 79-80 (1988) (challenge to the size of the punitive award had not been raised in the state
court).
35. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
36. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
37. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
38. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262-64.
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held that the clause does not apply to punitive damage awards be-
tween private parties. 9 Once again, the Court raised expectations
that it would consider a due process challenge in an appropriate
case.
40
Three years later, an appropriate case properly raising a due
process challenge to punitive damages presented itself. In Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,"I six of the justices agreed
that although due process imposes some limits on punitive dam-
ages, those limits were not exceeded by Alabama's system of
awarding punitive damages.42 Although the Court again mentioned
its "concern about punitive damages that 'run wild'," 3 it refused
to draw a "mathematical bright line" to determine whether puni-
tive damages are excessive.4" Instead, the Court considered Ala-
bama's procedures for awarding punitive damages, including the
jury instructions and post-verdict and appellate standards of re-
view, to conclude that Pacific Mutual's due process rights had not
been violated. 5
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia advocated a historical ap-
proach to the due process issue. Based on venerable common-law
tradition of jury-assessed punitive damages, Justice Scalia would
have approved the punitive award against Pacific Mutual without
inquiring into questions of reasonableness. 6 At the other extreme,
Justice O'Connor wrote a forceful dissent arguing that Alabama's
common-law procedures for awarding punitive damages were void
for vagueness and, alternatively, that the lack of procedural safe-
guards violated the defendant's right to procedural due process.' 7
Although the Court in Haslip left open the possibility that a pu-
nitive award might under some circumstances violate due process,
the Court's balancing approach and fact-specific holding provided
little guidance as to what those constitutional limits might be.
Lower courts reviewing punitive verdicts in light of Haslip have
39. Id. at 264.
40. Id. at 276-77. "There is some authority in our opinions for the view that the Due
Process Clause places outer limits on the size of a civil damages award made pursuant to a
statutory scheme. Id. at 276 (citing St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S.
63, 66-67 (1919)).
41. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
42. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-23.
43. Id. at 18.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 19-20.
46. Id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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upheld a variety of state punitive damage procedures, including
some that differ substantially from Alabama's.4 8
Whether a logical relationship need exist between the size of a
punitive award and the plaintiff's compensatory damages was con-
sidered by the Court in the 1993 case, TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp. 9 In that case, a common-law slander of
title action, the plaintiff had been awarded $19,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages in the state
trial court.50 The plaintiff argued at trial that any damages
awarded should be based on the defendant's vast wealth and the
financial gains the defendant hoped to achieve by its conduct." In
its appeal before the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that
the unlimited discretion of the jury in granting the punitive award,
and the lack of a reasonable relationship between the plaintiff's
actual injury and the size of the punitive award, deprived the de-
fendant of its property without due process of law.5
Despite the magnitude of the punitive award, which was 526
times larger than the accompanying compensatory damages, the
Court rejected the due process objection.5 3 Writing for a plurality
of the Court, Justice Stevens cited Haslip to reiterate that the
Court could not devise a mathematical formula to determine the
constitutionality of punitive damages.5" Although the plurality
stated that reasonableness should be considered, the Court found
that the jury's award could be justified based on the potential
harm posed by the defendant's conduct. 55
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, repeated his Haslip ar-
gument that as long as the traditional common-law procedures are
followed in assessing punitive damages, due process has been
met.5 Justice O'Connor dissented, joined this time by Justices
White and Souter, calling the $10 million punitive award "mon-
strous" and the system for awarding punitive damages "arbitrary
48. For a partial list of cases considering the constitutionality of state punitive dam-
ages procedures, see Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532, 537,
n.4 (1992).
49. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
50. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2714.
51. Id. at 2716-17.
52. Id. at 2718.
53. Id. at 2718-20.
54. Id. at 2720.
55. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720-21.
56. Id. at 2726 (Scalia, J., concurring).
674 Vol. 32:667
Punitive Damages in Libel Actions
and oppressive.""
After Haslip and TXO, it appears that a majority of the Court is
unwilling to engage in meaningful reform of traditional punitive
damages procedures in cases involving only due process considera-
tions. As Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion, the Court
now may dispose of most due process challenges to punitive dam-
ages by concluding that "this is no worse than TXO." 8 However,
when punitive damages are awarded in libel cases, significant First
Amendment concerns arise. To evaluate First Amendment argu-
ments against punitive damages in defamation actions, it is neces-
sary to consider the Court's previous decisions in this area.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN LIBEL ACTIONS
The threat of large, potentially fatal damage awards against the
press in libel actions was a decisive factor in the Supreme Court's
1964 landmark decision in New York Times v. Sullivan.9 In that
case, an Alabama jury imposed a $500,000 verdict against the New
York Times for allegedly libeling a Montgomery police commis-
sioner in an editorial advertisement supporting the civil rights
movement.6 0 At that time, the $500,000 verdict was the largest li-
bel verdict ever awarded in the state, and was considered huge by
national standards."' Meanwhile, four other Montgomery officials
commenced libel actions against the Times seeking various
amounts in damages, all based on the same advertisement, with
one of the suits resulting in another $500,000 judgment.6 2 Even a
newspaper as prestigious and successful as the Times could not af-
ford a possible three million dollars in liability.6
In the early 1960s, Commissioner Sullivan was not the only
Southern officeholder who attempted to use libel law to dissuade
the press from reporting on racial strife. By 1964, libel suits total-
ing approximately three hundred million dollars had been brought
against the press by various Southern officials.6 4 That the Court
57. Id. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring).
59. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
60. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. The jury did not indicate whether any part of the ver-
dict was punitive in nature. Id. at 284.
61. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW 35 (1991).
62. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278 n.18.
63. In his book about the Sullivan case, Anthony Lewis quotes a Times representa-
tive who feared that had the jury verdicts ultimately been upheld, the Times continued
existence would have been imperiled. LEwIs, cited at note 61, at 35.
64. LEWIS, cited at note 61, at 36.
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was troubled about the impact of these lawsuits was clear from the
Court's opinion, where Justice Brennan wrote:
The judgment awarded in this case-without the need for any proof of ac-
tual pecuniary loss-was one thousand times greater than the maximum
fine provided by the Alabama criminal statute, and one hundred times
greater than that provided by the Sedition Act. And since there is no
double-jeopardy limitation applicable to civil lawsuits, this is not the only
judgment that may be awarded against petitioners for the same publication.
Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the
pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public
criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot
survive."'
The Court dealt with its concern about the chilling effect of
large libel judgments not by limiting libel damages, but rather by
engrafting a fault requirement onto the libel tort."6 Before the Sul-
livan decision, libel as defined in Alabama and in most states was a
strict liability tort. To prove a prima facie case, the plaintiff
needed only to show that the defendant published a defamatory
statement concerning the plaintiff.6 7 Removing ultimate control of
libel law from the states, the Court held that the First Amendment
would no longer allow public officials to recover damages because
of someone's innocent mistake.6 8 Instead, public officials suing for
defamatory falsehoods about their official conduct would have to
prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice"-knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. 9 The common law de-
fense of truth was insufficient protection against libel actions, the
Court said, because the difficulty and cost of proving truth would
necessarily result in self-censorship.70 In free debate, factual mis-
statements are unavoidable and must be tolerated to provide the
65. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277-78.
66. Interestingly, the Times' attorney, constitutional scholar Herbert Wechsler, con-
sidered asking the Court to limit libel damages to the amount of proven financial injury. He
decided against doing so for fear the Court would be reluctant to change traditional, com-
mon-law methods of awarding libel damages. See LEwis, cited at note 61, at 223.
67. LEWIS, cited at note 61, at 28; RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION, § 1.03[1]-
[2] (1991).
68. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277-78.
69. Id. at 279-80.
70. Id. at 279. The Court predicted that:
[u]nder such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true,
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to
do so.
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"breathing space" needed for free expression.7 1 Drawing an anal-
ogy to seditious libel, the Court concluded that because speech
criticizing the activities of public officials is essential for self-gov-
ernment, it therefore must be accorded the highest First Amend-
ment protection. 2
Three years after Sullivan, a severely fragmented Supreme
Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts7 expanded the scope of
the actual malice rule to apply to public figures and public officials.
In an opinion joined by only three other justices, Justice Harlan
rejected the defendant magazine's argument that an unlimited jury
award of punitive damages in a libel action constitutes a prior re-
straint.7 ' Justice Harlan reasoned that First Amendment concerns
are adequately defended by the judicial power to control both ex-
cessive jury verdicts and damage awards based on jury bias.75 Al-
though Justice Harlan stated that punitive damages "serve a
wholly legitimate purpose in the protection of individual reputa-
tion", he noted that they must "not be founded on the mere
prejudice of the jury.
'7 6
In extending the actual malice rule to public figures, the Court
in Butts recognized the importance of the free flow of information
regarding all matters of public interest.7 7 Chief Justice Warren, in
his concurring opinion, reasoned that in modern society, "the dis-
tinctions between governmental and private sectors are blurred, 78
meaning that important policy decisions are often made by persons
who are in the public eye but do not hold public office.
7 e
In a 1971 case, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,80 three dissenting
justices expressed disapproval with the status of punitive damages
in libel law. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stewart, compared
punitive damages to criminal penalties that are' awarded in unlim-
ited amounts.8' Marshall reasoned that standardless jury discretion
to impose punitive awards creates unpredictability - which leads
71. Id. at 271-72.
72. Id. at 273-78.
73. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
74. Butts, 388 U.S. at 159-160.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 161.
77. Id. at 147.
78. Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
79. Butts, 388 U.S. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
80. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
81. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 82-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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to self-censorship and defeats any state interest in deterrence.2
Unrestrained discretion also "'allows juries to penalize heavily the
unorthodox and the unpopular and exact little from others. Such
free wheeling discretion presents obvious and basic threats to soci-
ety's interest in freedom of the press.
83
Because of these objections, Justice Marshall advocated abolish-
ing punitive damages in private libel actions while allowing states
to apply any fault standard above strict liability. 4 In addition,
Justice Harlan reconsidered his earlier position and concluded that
to be constitutional, punitive damages must "bear a reasonable
and purposeful relationship to the actual harm done." 85
The misgivings expressed in these dissents about the propriety
of punitive damages in libel actions were reflected by the majority
of the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.86 By a vote of five to
four, the Court in Gertz held that as long as state law does not
impose strict liability, states may decide which standard of fault to
apply in defamation actions involving private plaintiffs.8 " Writing
for the Court, Justice Powell identified the state interest justifying
libel laws as compensation for harm resulting from defamatory
falsehoods. 8 This meant that the state had no interest in compen-
sating defamed plaintiffs beyond their actual injury. 9 Justice Pow-
ell noted that both presumed ° and punitive damages create a dan-
ger of media self-censorship. Powell also described punitive
damages as "wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a
negligence standard for private defamation actions. They are not
compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by
civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence."
91
82. Id. at 84.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 86-87.
85. Id. at 77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
87. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
88. Id. at 341.
89. Id. at 349. "[Tihe States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs
such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual in-
jury." Id.
90. SMOLLA, cited at note 67, at § 9.05[1]. Presumed damages are compensatory dam-
ages awarded in libel actions without proof of actual injury. The jury is allowed to presume
the existence of injury from the fact that defamatory falsehoods were published. The ration-
ale for the doctrine rests on the difficulty of proving actual harm in defamation cases. Ep-
stein, cited at note 3, at 794.
91. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
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Consequently, the Court held that neither presumed nor puni-
tive damages could be recovered in a case without a finding of "at
least" knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, even
when the plaintiff is a private individual.2 With this holding, the
Court acknowledged that the First Amendment limits the award of
punitive damages in libel suits. Justice White, however, vigorously
disagreed, stating that no evidence had been shown to justify the
Court's fear that punitive damages are "unduly burdensome. ' 93
The Court's holding in. Gertz, that no punitive or presumed
damages could be recovered without a showing of actual malice,
was significantly restricted eleven years later in Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc."4 The case involved a construction
contractor who brought suit against Dun & Bradstreet for circulat-
ing an erroneous and defamatory credit report. 5 At trial, the
plaintiff was awarded $300,000 in punitive damages even though
the defendant was not found to have acted with actual malice.6
The issue before the Court was whether the Gertz rule regarding
presumed and punitive damages applied to speech that did not in-
volve "matters of public concern.' 
'9
Although five justices agreed to uphold the jury verdict, the
Court could not agree on an opinion. Justice Powell, writing for a
plurality that included himself, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice
O'Connor, reasoned that because private matters do not affect de-
bate on public issues, the First Amendment allows punitive and
presumed damages to be awarded in such cases without a showing
of actual malice. 8 With respect to presumed damages, Justice
Powell based his conclusion on the long common-law history re-
garding such damages in libel actions. As for punitive damages,
Justice Powell asserted that in private plaintiff actions, they fur-
ther the state interest in providing effective remedies for
defamation.9
In a concurring opinion, Justice White indicated his disenchant-
ment with the Sullivan rule, stating that it "struck an improvident
balance" between the public's right to know and the individual's
92. Id. at 349.
93. Id. at 397-98 (White, J., dissenting).
94. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
95. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751.
96. Id. at 751-52.
97. Id. at 751.
98. Id. at 762-63.
99. Id. at 760-61.
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right to reputation. 00 He suggested setting constitutional limits on
recoverable damages in libel cases, in exchange for a return to the
common-law strict liability standard."0 Punitive and/or presumed
damages might be eliminated, which would provide "breathing
room" for speech without overly restricting libel victims' ability to
restore their reputation.0 2
Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice Bren-
nan's dissent, which would have allowed the punitive award to
stand only upon a showing of actual malice."0 3 Despite this conclu-
sion, Justice Brennan criticized the propriety of awarding punitive
and presumed damages in libel cases at all. Limits on speech must
be narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate state interest, Justice
Brennan observed, and the "ready availability and unconstrained
application of presumed and punitive damages in libel actions is
too blunt a regulatory instrument to satisfy this First Amendment
principle . .1.0."'4
In this string of cases setting forth standards of recovery for dif-
ferent types of libel plaintiffs, the Court has not directly consid-
ered a challenge to punitive damages awarded to a public plaintiff
involved in a' matter of public concern. However, the Court has
had the opportunity to rule on such a situation, but declined to do
so. For example, in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacob-
son,10 5 the Seventh Circuit upheld $2,000,000 in punitive damages
and $1,000,000 in presumed damages against CBS in a case involv-
ing a public figure plaintiff. One commentator theorized that the
Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari because of reluctance to
consider First Amendment aspects of punitive damages in a case
where the defendant had acted in a blatantly reckless fashion. 06 In
anothcr case, DiSalie v. P.G. Publishing Co,'0 7 the Supreme Court
refused to consider a punitive award to a public figure plaintiff
predicated on a showing of both actual and common law malice.
In summary, the Supreme Court in Gertz precluded the recovery
of punitive and presumed damages in libel cases involving private
plaintiffs and public issues except on a showing of actual malice.
100. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 767 (White, J., concurring).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 771-72.
103. Id. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 933 (1988).
106. Barron, cited at note 14, at 109.
107. 544 A.2d 1345 (Pa. Super. 1988), alloc. denied, 557 A.2d 724 (Pa.), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 906 (1989).
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With respect to private plaintiffs involved in matters of private
concern, Dun & Bradstreet held that punitive and presumed dam-
ages could be recovered on a lesser showing of fault. To date, the
Court has not considered the constitutionality of punitive damages
in a case involving a public plaintiff involved in a public concern.
Based on these precedents, how likely is it that the Court would
entertain a First Amendment challenge to punitive damages in a
public plaintiff libel case?
Beginning with the Sullivan case, the Court has shown obvious
apprehension about the chilling effect of unlimited punitive awards
in libel cases involving public plaintiffs. Based on the language and
reasoning in Gertz, a strong First Amendment argument can be
made to eliminate punitive damages in defamation actions, at least
those involving public figures in matters of public interest. The
membership of the Court has changed since certiorari was denied
in Brown & Williamson and DiSalle. The Court may now be more
receptive to empirical data showing the continued growth of puni-
tive awards in libel cases."' Even if the Supreme Court is unwill-
ing to abolish punitive damages in public plaintiff defamation ac-
tions, this article takes the position that public policy
considerations justify state regulation of punitive awards by either
legislative reform or judicial determination.
IV. RATIONALE FOR ELIMINATING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN LIBEL
New York Times v. Sullivan"°9 sought to prevent the threat of
immense libel verdicts from stifling robust debate about public is-
sues. 10 By adding a fault requirement to the common law libel
tort, the Court may have succeeded in assuring that fewer libel
plaintiffs ultimately recover against the press.' However, the eco-
nomic concern that motivated the actual malice rule has survived
and become more dangerous." 2 Even adjusting for inflation, libel
108. Of course, the fact that the Supreme Court has denied a petition for certiorari in
a given case carries no precedential value. However, following the Court's denial of certiorari
in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 485 U.S. 933 (1988), one commentator
was led to describe the chances of the Court eliminating punitive damages in libel law as
"quite bleak." SMOLLA, cited at note 67, at § 9.08[4].
109. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
110. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.
111. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 509; Epstein, cited at note 3, at 806.
112. See, eg., Henry R. Kaufman, Trend in Damage Awards, Insurance Premiums
and the Cost of Media Libel Litigation, in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLI-
CATIONS, cited at note 4, at 4. Data from an LDRC study show that damage awards in pre-
Sullivan cases from 1954 to 1964 averaged $128,933. This figure includes one multi-million
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damage awards in the 1980s were estimated as between four and
five hundred percent larger than those imposed during the decade
before Sullivan.11 According to one study, average libel verdicts in
the early 1980s were approximately three times greater than aver-
age damages awarded in medical malpractice and product liability
actions." 4
Punitive damages have played a substantial part in the growing
size of libel judgments. LDRC statistics show that punitive dam-
ages were granted in fifty-seven percent of libel verdicts in the
1980s and in seventy-six percent of such verdicts in 1990 and 1991.
When libel judgments included a punitive element, figures for 1980
to 1991 indicated that punitive damages made up from sixty to
seventy percent of the total dollars awarded."15 The apparent fail-
ure of the actual malice rule to protect the press from shockingly
large damage awards makes it essential to evaluate the arguments
for eliminating punitive damages in libel law, at least in cases in-
volving public plaintiffs where First Amendment concerns are the
strongest.
A. Punitive Damage Awards Chill Protected Speech
In the early 1980s, the Alton Telegraph, an Illinois paper, in-
curred a $9.2 million libel judgment, which included $2.5 million in
punitive damages."' Rather than declare bankruptcy, the paper
settled the case for $1.4 million. 1 7 Following this episode, the pa-
per significantly changed its reporting policies and refused to in-
vestigate possible government misconduct for fear of libel suits." '
"We're like a tight end who hears footsteps every time he runs to
catch a pass," the paper's editor told the Wall Street Journal.11 9
"Wouldn't you be gun-shy if you nearly lost your livelihood and
dollar award. If this award is excluded from the calculation, the average initial damage
award in the decade before Sullivan drops to $49,715.
In comparison, LDRC figures for 1980 to 1989 show the average jury award in libel and
related communication tort cases at $1,467,525 and the average bench award at $1,020,549.
For 1990-91, the average jury award increased to more than $9 million. LDRC RECAP AND
UPDATE, cited at note 8, at 3-5.
113. Kaufman, cited at note 112, at 4.
114. Id. at 5.
115. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, cited at note 8, at 3-5.
116. John Curley, How Libel Suit Sapped the Crusading Spirit of a Small Newspa-
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your home?"' 120
The Alton Telegraph's libel experience illustrates the chilling ef-
fect associated with the possibility of huge libel verdicts. The risk
of incurring a potentially devastating libel judgment deters the
press from engaging in protected, newsworthy speech-what noted
expert Professor Anderson termed the "in terrorem" effect.' 21 De-
ciding not to cover a story will rarely make or break a media out-
let's reputation or fortune; however, covering a story that results in
a libel suit raises the possibility of financial ruin. Dropping the
controversial story may often be the editor's safest course.' 22
Furthermore, the fear of exorbitant awards means the press
must defend each libel claim to the death, resulting in long and
expensive litigation. 2 3 At least part of libel's chill comes from the
enormous legal fees attendant upon fighting defamation suits. Ac-
cording to one study, libel defense spending in the mid-1980s
ranged from $75,000 to $150,000;124 the ILRP found libel defense
expenditures reaching as high as $95,000.125 In comparison, a 1982
Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice study found the aver-
age cost per tort case filed in federal court was $1,740 and the av-
erage cost for a federal jury trial in all cases varied from $8,000 to
$15,000.126
Empirical evidence has shown that most libel verdicts are over-
turned or reduced on appeal. Figures gathered by the LDRC show
that from 1980 to 1989, approximately twenty-nine percent of libel
jury awards were overturned or modified in the defendant's favor
at the post-trial motion stage, and on appeal more than fifty per-
cent of the surviving verdicts were reversed.2 7 In total, approxi-
mately seventy-five percent of initial jury and bench awards were
reversed or reduced in favor of the libel defendant. 128
While these figures may seem to undercut the chilling effect ar-
gument against punitive damages in libel actions, it is important to
120. Id.
121. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 516. Professor Anderson also identifies the chilling
effect of a large judgment on a media outlet's balance sheet, where until overturned, it may
negatively affect the ability of the organization to acquire financing. Id.
122. Committee on Communications Law, Punitive Damages in Libel Actions, 42 REC.
OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, 20, 24 (1986).
123. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 516; LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, cited at note 8, at
19.
124. Kaufman, cited at note 112, at 9.
125. Bezanson, cited at note 11, at 35.
126. Kaufman, cited at note 112, at 9.
127. Id.
128. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, cited at note 8, at 3-4.
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remember that the press can be "chilled" as much from the pay-
ment of legal fees incurred to avoid huge verdicts as from the ver-
dicts themselves. Furthermore, the chilling consequences of a large
damage award arise when the verdict is entered; post-verdict and
appellate review cannot undo the harm. Under the current damage
system, even winning a libel case can cause the press to tread more
cautiously.
It has been argued that punitive damages are not unique to libel
law, and should not be eliminated in defamation if they remain in
other types of actions." 9 Doctors, lawyers, and other professionals
adapt their conduct to the threat of punitive damages, so journal-
ists should behave with potential punitive liability in mind.130
However, this rationale neglects the core of the chilling effect argu-
ment. Punitive damages in defamation suits deter speech-an ac-
tivity protected by the First Amendment. Defamation law cannot
be treated just like another area of tort law; the First Amendment
guarantees that speech will be afforded an extra measure of protec-
tion, especially when the speech involves matters of public
interest. 
1 3
Others maintain that the chilling effect objection is irrelevant
because no constitutionally protected speech is at issue when puni-
tive damages are awarded in libel actions. 132 According to this
view, defamatory speech falls outside the scope of First Amend-
ment coverage, and therefore punitive damages in defamation ac-
tions raise no constitutional considerations. 133 For example, the
Seventh Circuit in Brown & Williamson13 4 used this reasoning to
uphold a $2,000,000 punitive award against CBS, saying that "false
statements of fact made with actual malice are not protected by
the First Amendment." 135
129. Halpern, cited at note 3, at 246.
130. A plurality of the Supreme Court took this view in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
338 U.S. 130 (1967), where Justice Harlan wrote, "[t]o exempt a publisher, because of the
nature of his calling, from an imposition generally exacted from other members of the com-
munity, would be to extend a protection not required by the constitutional guarantee."
Butts, 338 U.S. at 159-60. See text accompanying notes 73-79.
131. Van Alstyne, cited at note 13, at 819. Professor Van Alstyne has decried the ten-
dency of courts to consider freedom of speech as just another factor to be measured in
balancing interests. Rather, the First Amendment provides a "subsidy" that "exempts free
speech and freedom of the press from being treated simply as any other activity examined
in the common law." Id.
132. See, e.g., Committee on Communications Law, cited at note 122, at 60.
133. Id.
134. 827 F.2d 1119, 1143 (7th Cir. 1987).
135. Brown, 827 F.2d at 1143.
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The problem with this contention, as noted by Professor Barron,
is that it relies on a circular argument.38 Speech in general is shel-
tered by the First Amendment; it can only be classified as constitu-
tionally unprotected after a legal determination to that effect. As
with obscenity, reasonable minds may not agree which statements
or broadcasts rise to the level of defamatory speech. Unfortunately,
the journalist must publish without the benefit of a legal ruling;
therefore, the mere possibility of an adverse finding may chill
speech that ultimately would not have resulted in liability.
3 7
A more troublesome objection to the chilling effect argument
contests its very existence. Professor Barron, for example, has as-
serted that it can be neither proven nor disproven that punitive
damages chill free expression.1 38 Justice White, dissenting in Gertz,
objected that the Court's decision requiring private libel plaintiffs
to show actual malice to recover punitive damages was based on no
more than "undifferentiated fear of unduly burdensome punitive
damages awards." ' 9 In fact, Justice White questioned the wisdom
of relying on the chilling effect argument to justify imposing any
fault requirement in libel actions involving private plaintiffs:
The press today is vigorous and robust. To me, it is quite incredible to sug-
gest that threats of libel suits from private citizens are causing the press to
refrain from publishing the truth. I know of no hard facts to support that
proposition, and the Court furnishes none."0
Here it becomes almost impossible to separate the chilling effect
associated with a particular standard of liability in libel actions
from the chilling effect of exorbitant punitive damage awards. Of
course, the two are intimately related. A media outlet may refrain
from publishing newsworthy information because it fears both be-
ing found guilty of publishing defamatory material with actual
malice and the consequent imposition of a money judgment that
includes punitive damages. Huge damage awards are the teeth that
provide the bite associated with libel liability standards.
Because of this interdependence between libel liability standards
and damage awards, a 1986 study establishing that legal standards
in defamation suits influence editorial behavior is relevant when
evaluating the effect of punitive damages. The study, which in-
136. Barron, cited at note 14, at 110.
137. " Barron, cited at note 14, at 110. See also, Committee on Communications Law,
cited at note 122, at 21.
138. Barron, cited at note 14, at 108.
139. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 397 (White, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 390. (White, J., dissenting).
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volved a survey of 206 newspaper editors, revealed that newspapers
would be substantially less likely to publish information on mat-
ters of public interest if the fault requirement for libel was reduced
to either negligence or strict liability."" Factors that influenced the
extent of the chilling effect for specific papers included whether
the publication relied on significant street sales, whether it faced
competition in its market, and whether it had previously been sued
for and paid damages in a libel suit.142 Interestingly, neither geo-
graphic location of the paper nor existence of libel insurance was
shown to reduce the chilling effect of a change in liability
standards. 4"
Admittedly, this study did not address the chilling effect of pu-
nitive damages; however, it cannot be disputed that the possibility
of huge damage awards constitutes a major factor in how willing an
editor will be to publish a particular story. The press is not una-
ware of the trend toward oversized libel verdicts, most of which
include large punitive awards. The study provides empirical evi-
dence of libel's chilling effect at work, and refutes the claim that
all evidence of self-censorship is anecdotal.
B. Punitive Damage Awards Are Used to Punish Unpopular
Speakers or Opinions
Closely related to the chilling effect argument is the propensity
of jurors to use exemplary awards to penalize publications they
find distasteful. 44 The LDRC's compilation of libel cases brought
from 1980 to 1991 shows that defendants such as the National En-
quirer, Hustler and Penthouse magazines have suffered punitive
141. Stephen M. Renas et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Chilling Effect: Are
Newspapers Affected by Liability Standards in Defamation Actions?, in THE COST OF LI-
BEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, cited at note 4, at 48. The survey provided defini-
tions of the three liability standards (strict liability, negligence, and actual malice) and
presented four "scenarios" involving public officials. Editors were asked to indicate their
willingness to publish the stories under each of the liability standards. The percentage of
editors who were less likely to publish when liability changed from actual malice to negli-
gence varied by scenario from 23.3% to 34%. The percentage of editors chilled as a result of
a change from actual malice to strict liability ranged by scenario from 35.9% to 49.5%.
Approximately 70% of the editors who were chilled as a result of a shift from actual malice
to strict liability were also chilled when the standard switched from actual malice to negli-
gence. Id. at 45-50.
142. Renas et al., cited at note 141, at 55.
143. Id. at 54.
144. See, DeVore & Nelson, cited at note 13, at 178-79; Van Alstyne, cited at note 13,
at 807-08.
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jury verdicts reaching into the millions of dollars.141 Considering
that most of these awards are reversed or reduced on appeal, it
appears that juries base their decisions at least in part on the un-
savory nature of the periodical in question. The ability of juries to
punish unpopular speakers by awarding punitive damages in ruin-
ous amounts flies in the face of the First Amendment, which pro-
tects unorthodox as well as mainstream speech.
Exacerbating the problem is the fact that juries almost always
award punitive damages upon a finding of actual malice, even if
the state law requires a further showing of common law malice or
ill will. 4 ' By focusing on the defendant's degree of culpability, libel
law creates what Professor Anderson described as "potent threats
of punishment for unpopular journalism."' 47 Trial judges may also
sustain punitive damage awards based on their own "constitution-
ally improper" aversion to disreputable or obscure publications.'48
Sometimes punitive damages are awarded in libel actions even
though the plaintiff has suffered no significant injury or does not
have a case justifying liability.'49 According to one estimate, from
one third to one half of all defamation suits against the press are
essentially harassment suits.15 ° These actions are often brought by
plaintiffs who desire to retaliate against the press for publishing
reports that are derogatory but basically truthful, and to intimi-
date publishers from printing similar critical stories in the fu-
ture.15 1 When such stories involve public officials, juries and judges
may use punitive damages to punish the press for being "disre-
spectful."' 52 Although these verdicts usually will be overturned
145. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, cited at note 8, at A1-B8, citing Burnett v. National
Enquirer, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Ct. App. 1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984)
($1,300,000 initial punitive award); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1094 (1986) ($1,500,000 initial punitive award); Guccione v.
Hustler Magazine, 7 Media L. Rptr., 2077 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (initial punitive award
$37,000,000); Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1054 (1985) (initial punitive award $33,000,000); Marcone v. Penthouse, 754 F.2d
1072 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985) (initial punitive award $537,000); Pring v.
Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 637 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982) (initial punitive award $25,000,000). See
also, Committee on Communications Law, cited at note 122, at 39.
146. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 523; Van Alstyne, cited at note 13, at 797.
147. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 523; see also Van Alstyne, cited at note 13, at 797.
148. Van Alstyne, cited at note 13, at 808.
149. Committee on Communications Law, cited at note 122, at 53 n.86.
150. David A. Hollander, The Economics of Libel Litigation, in THE COST OF LIBEL:
ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, cited at note 4, at 257, 266.
151. Hollander, cited at note 150, at 266.
152. See Matheson, cited at note 3, at 274. Matheson speculated that judges may have
"exaggerated respect for aggrieved plaintiffs in substantial positions of authority." Id.
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post-trial or on appeal, they may succeed in stifling dissent.
Additionally, it must be noted that it is often the smaller, finan-
cially insecure publications that contain the most unorthodox con-
tent. The threat of a huge exemplary award would be particularly
devastating to such a defendant, and could leave a special interest
group without a voice. 153
C. Punitive Damage Awards Do Not Serve the State Interest in
Punishment or Deterrence, Resulting in a Violation of Due Pro-
cess
Punitive damages are most commonly defended as a means of
prohibiting and penalizing reprehensible behavior that, although
deleterious to society, does not violate the criminal law. 15' Mere
compensation of the victim is seen as insufficient either to punish
such egregious conduct or to protect the community from its recur-
rence.1 55 One general objection to this rationale for punitive dam-
ages is based on the historic compensatory function of the civil law
system.15 According to this view, punishment has no place in the
civil law, where juries have neither the ability to devise appropri-
ate penalties nor the ability to identify which defendants deserve
to be punished. Furthermore, civil punishments are imposed with-
out the safeguards guaranteed to criminal defendants, such as the
protection against double jeopardy, the limitation on amounts of
criminal fines, and the evidentiary standard of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.'57
In libel law, this general objection to punitive damages becomes
even more acute because the conduct being punished and pre-
vented enjoys constitutional protection. The First Amendment
raises speech above the norm and requires special considerations
not attendant in other areas of tort law. According to the Sullivan
decision, wide-ranging deliberation on matters of public concern
153. Note, Punitive Damages in Defamation Litigation: A Clear and Present Danger
to Freedom of Speech, 64 YALE L.J. 610, 613 (1955). "A punitive damage award that is not
so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience may be a sufficient financial burden to si-
lence a voice of dissent." Id.
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977): "Punitive damages are
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish
him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct
in the future." Id.
155. Ellis, cited at note 32, at 11.
156. Sales & Cole, cited at note 16, at 1158.
157. Id.
688 Vol. 32:667
Punitive Damages in Libel Actions
should be nurtured and promoted, not punished and deterred.'58
Errors in debate are certain to occur and must be countenanced to
achieve the free exchange of ideas needed for a healthy society.'5 9
The Court in Sullivan sought to reduce the capacity of libel law to
punish speech. The ability of courts to award punitive damages in
defamation actions, at least those involving matters of public inter-
est, directly contradicts this goal.' 60
The Court in Gertz recognized compensation for reputational in-
jury as the sole state interest supporting libel law.' 6 ' Obviously,
punitive damages generally do not serve to compensate, but rather
provide a monetary award above and beyond the plaintiff's actual
injuries. However, the Court went on to allow punitive damages in
libel cases involving private figure plaintiffs involved in matters of
public concern on a showing of "at least" actual malice.' 62 This
reasoning leaves room for a decision holding that the First Amend-
ment prevents assessing punitive damages against defendants in
public figure and public official cases at least in the context of un-
intentional defamation.
Even assuming that punishment and deterrence of speech are
found to be acceptable goals of defamation law, these ends can be
achieved through less onerous means than exorbitant punitive
damage awards. Compensatory damages awarded in libel actions,
plus high legal defense costs, arguably constitute sufficient reason
for most defendants to exercise more care in the future.'63 Four
types of compensatory damages can be recovered in libel actions:
(1) special damages, such as those involving pecuniary injury such
as lost wages; (2) general damages to plaintiff's reputation sup-
ported by proof of injury; (3) general emotional damage supported
by proof of injury; and (4) general damages to plaintiff's reputation
not supported by evidence but "presumed" to exist.16 4 Therefore,
compensatory damages in libel do more than simply compensate
158. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. "Thus we consider this case against the background of
a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id.
159. Id. at 271-72.
160. See DeVore & Nelson, cited at note 13, at 166.
161. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341..
162. Id. at 349. See also text accompanying notes 86-93.
163. Jollymore, cited at note 13, at 1386, n.28. For figures relating to legal defense
costs in libel actions, see text accompanying notes 123-128.
164. SMOLLA, cited at note 67, at § 9.08[4]. In Gertz, the Court held that private plain-
tiffs involved in matters of public concern must show actual malice on the part of the de-
fendant to recover presumed damages. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
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the plaintiff for out of pocket expenses; actual injuries include
mental suffering, humiliation, and loss of status in the community.
Additionally, the stigma of an adverse libel judgment imposes
less obvious negative consequences on a reporting or publishing de-
fendant. As a result of the actual malice requirement, inquiry in a
libel case focuses on the adequacy of the defendant's conduct in
reporting a story. A libel verdict, therefore, indicates to readers or
viewers that the defendant has acted without regard for the truth.
This may result in lessened demand for the defendant's product,
reducing the media outlet's bottom line.
165
Similarly, the media defendant's diminished reputation for qual-
ity journalism may result in increased labor costs. By being found
guilty of defamation, the organization in question becomes a less
attractive place to work for media professionals. To attract and re-
tain quality employees, the organization will have to provide
higher compensation. 66
Finally, the dishonor associated with an adverse libel judgment
may affect the organization's ability to gather news. Some news
sources may prefer to impart their information to other, seemingly
more accurate and credible, news organizations. 167 Given that un-
successful media defendants suffer these non-award costs on top of
providing compensation for all imaginable injury, a further award
of punitive damages can hardly be necessary either as punishment
or to dissuade future defamation.
As a consequence of the Gertz actual malice rule, punitive dam-
ages may be imposed on a defendant who is guilty of reckless or
negligent misconduct. But commentators have concluded that pu-
nitive damages are needed to attain optimal deterrence only when
the defendant has received an "illicit benefit" or acted in a morally
blameworthy fashion. 6 " In a libel context, punitive damages can
deter defamatory speech only when the defendant acted purpose-
165. Ronald A. Cass, Principle and Interest in Libel Law After New York Times: An
Incentive Analysis, in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, cited at note
4, at 69, 73-75 and n.57. The Washington Post's circulation figures declined by approxi-
mately five percent following the Court of Appeals' decision to reinstate the adverse jury
verdict in Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918
(1978).
166. Cass, cited at note 165, at 75-76.
167. Id. at 76.
168. See Ellis, cited at note 32, at 32; Jollymore, cited at note 13, at 850-51. Punitive
damages may also achieve optimal deterrence where compensatory damages do not ade-
quately reflect the harm caused, such as may occur when a tort victim refuses to sue to
redress an injury. This circumstance is unlikely to have much application in libel law. See
Jollymore, cited at note 13, at 856.
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fully and knowingly to inflict harm on the plaintiff. 69 Some states
require a finding that the defendant acted with intentional ill will,
or common law malice, before punitive damages may be
awarded. 70 In certain rare cases, a media defendant may indeed
publish defamatory falsehoods for the purpose of harming an-
other. 171 More commonly, however, a jury will assume the existence
of common law malice based on the evidence presented to prove
actual malice.172 In this case, a defendant who has not exhibited
conduct appropriate for retribution is subjected to a punitive
award not needed for deterrence.
Not only are punitive damages unnecessary to prevent uninten-
tional defamation, they are inefficient as well. Historically, juries
have been given wide latitude to compute exemplary awards. Most
states temper the jury's pleasure by requiring only that such
awards bear a "reasonable relationship" to compensatory damages,
or that punitive awards not be "excessive. ''17 However, excessive-
ness is often determined simply by comparing the size of the puni-
tive award to the defendant's wealth, or what has been called the
"net worth test."'7 4 Virtually unlimited jury discretion results in
unpredictability. Damage awards cannot effectively deter miscon-
duct when no logical correlation exists between the size of the
award and the severity of the defendant's behavior. 17 5 Neither can
exemplary damages discourage contemplated conduct when poten-
tial defendants cannot determine either the likelihood or the mag-
nitude of such awards.1
7 6
Accordingly, it can be argued that the arbitrary imposition of
169. Id. at 855.
170. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 514. Professor Anderson reported that most states
require common law malice be shown to recover punitive damages in defamation suits. Id.
But see, Jollymore, cited at note 13, at 854 (most states require a mere showing of actual
malice to award punitive damages).
171. See, e.g., Autobuses Internacionales S De R.L., Ltd. v. El Continental Publishing
Co., 483 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), where newspapers allegedly published sto-
ries designed to ruin plaintiff's business after attempting to extort money from the plaintiff;
Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 680, 686 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 882 (1975), where newspaper allegedly published misleading headlines as part of
scheme to injure political candidate two weeks before election.
172. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 514.
173. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
174. DeVore & Nelson, cited at note 13, at 171. For example, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld a $2,000,000 punitive verdict as not excessive against CBS after
considering the network's net worth of one and a half billion dollars. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 933 (1988).
175. DeVore & Nelson, cited at note 13, at 170.
176. Id. at 176.
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punitive damages in libel cases violates the requirements of due
process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.177 Although
TXO seems to indicate that an exemplary award will not offend
due process solely on the grounds of disparity between compensa-
tory and punitive damages, TXO did not involve a communica-
tions tort.178 Defamation cases raise First Amendment considera-
tions, which compel heightened due process procedures.
1 79
Standardless jury discretion to award unlimited punitive damages
in a First Amendment context where jurors may impose exemplary
awards based on the same evidence used to determine liability,
coupled with post-trial review using considerations of excessiveness
measured by net worth, may be found by the Supreme Court to
exceed the due process limits acknowledged in Haslip but not
defined."' 0
Although plaintiffs in libel cases usually ask for large compensa-
tory and punitive awards, empirical evidence shows that few public
plaintiffs sue for either money or retribution. Data gathered by the
Iowa Libel Research Project revealed that most public official and
public figure libel plaintiffs file suit to clear their names.'81 Only
about thirty percent of public or private plaintiffs brought suit to
punish the defendant. 82 Few litigants can realistically be expected
to refuse a windfall punitive award; however, it cannot be convinc-
ingly argued that the state has a valid interest in punishing libel
defendants when retribution is not a major concern for libel
victims.
D. Punitive Damage Awards Are Not Effective to Vindicate
Reputational Interests
One major goal of the Sullivan actual malice rule was to reduce
the number of libel suits brought by public officials who objected
to criticisms of their official conduct.'83  However, plain-
tiffs-especially public officials and public figures-continue to
bring defamation suits against the press, even though the necessity
177. Id. at 169.
178. TXO, 113 S. Ct. 2711. See text accompanying notes 49-58.
179. For a thorough discussion of the due process objections to punitive damage
awards in defamation actions, see DeVore & Nelson, cited at note 13, at 168-175.
180. See text accompanying notes 41-48.
181. Bezanson et al., cited at note 11, at 33.
182. Id. at 35-36.
183. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 63
(1988). Professor Kalven described the case as "authoritatively declaring the unconstitution-
ality of seditious libel." Id.
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of proving actual malice has considerably lessened their chances of
success.' 84 Studying cases decided ten to twenty years after Sulli-
van, the Iowa Libel Research Project found most libel plaintiffs
were well-known community leaders whose actions were based on
stories concerning their public or political conduct.'85 Why would a
public plaintiff sue for defamation knowing that the alleged libel
will probably be repeated in media coverage of the suit, knowing
that the average libel suit takes four years to complete, and know-
ing that the likelihood of ultimate victory is slim?'86
Defamation actions brought by public officials are usually moti-
vated by reasons unconnected with financial injury or loss of in-
come.' 87 While private plaintiffs sue chiefly for damages and retri-
bution, public plaintiffs litigate to reestablish their good names.' 88
Most of the rewards of officeholding and community service are
nonmonetary; those who choose the path of public service can be
expected to value reputational interests more than loss of in-
come.' 89 Almost three-quarters of the libel plaintiffs interviewed by
the ILRP contended they would have been sufficiently appeased
by a retraction, correction, or apology by the press to refrain from
litigation. 90
Several commentators have concluded that libel litigation con-
tinues to attract public plaintiffs because bringing a libel suit
serves in itself to vindicate tarnished reputations.' 91 Because pub-
lic plaintiffs generally prize their reputations more intensely than
do private individuals, they are more likely to overemphasize the
impact of an alleged libel on their professional lives.'92 Just by fil-
ing a libel suit, public officials generate media coverage and convey
the impression that their cases are solid enough to surmount the
hurdles associated with the actual malice rule.9 3 In fact, the pros-
pect of continued media attention invites public plaintiffs not only
to commence libel suits, but also to pursue them actively.
19
4
Whether or not such a plaintiff actually recovers a damage award
184. Cass, cited at note 165, at 70.
185. Bezanson et al., cited at note 11, at 24.
186. Id. at 23.
187. Id. at 25.
188. Id. at 25.
189. Cass, cited at note 165, at 86-87.
190. Bezanson et al., cited at note 11, at 25.
191. Cass, cited at note 165, at 85; Bezanson et al., cited at note 11, at 22.
192. Bezanson et al., cited at note 11, at 26.
193. Cass, cited at note 165, at 81.
194. Id. at 87.
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is irrelevant; significant nonmonetary objectives have already been
achieved.
This analysis reveals troubling flaws in our libel law system.
Ironically, the actual malice rule deters private plaintiffs more
than it does public plaintiffs, who continue to sue based on nonfi-
nancial incentives. At least with respect to public plaintiffs, puni-
tive damage awards fail to provide what libel plaintiffs want or
need.
On the other hand, some scholars believe that the possibility of
receiving punitive damages constitutes the only reason libel plain-
tiffs bring suit at all.19 5 According to this view, exemplary damages
protect reputational interests that otherwise get short-changed
under our current system. Professor Barron has called punitive
damages "virtually the last weapon left to the libel plaintiff" and
has suggested that without punitive damages, public plaintiffs
would be completely powerless against defamatory attacks.196 If
punitive damages are eliminated without changing some other as-
pect of defamation law to make recovery easier for libel plaintiffs,
this position holds that reputational interests will be left totally
unprotected and libel may as well be abolished.197 Furthermore,
both professors Anderson and Barron surmise that without the
lure of punitive recoveries, plaintiffs could not hire attorneys to
represent them in defamation actions.198 Lawyers would refuse to
undertake libel actions on a contingent fee basis if recovery were
restricted to actual injury.1 99
Despite the surface appeal of these arguments, various empirical
findings contest their accuracy. First, eight states have abolished or
significantly limited punitive damages in all civil cases, or in defa-
mation actions in particular."' Yet according to the LDRC study
of all reported communication tort cases from 1980 to 1991, libel
cases were brought in all but one of these jurisdictions.0 1 In fact,
the study revealed that healthy numbers of libel cases had been
brought in several of these states despite the impossibility of tradi-
195. See Anderson, cited at note 3, at 542; Barron, cited at note 14, at 111.
196. Barron, cited at note 14, at 111-12.
197. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 542, 554.
198. Id.
199. Id.; Barron, cited at note 14, at 122.
200. See notes 28-30. These eight states are Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Washington.
201. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, cited at note 8, at A1-B8. Although no libel cases were
listed for Oregon, three invasion of privacy cases, at least one of which involved a false light
privacy claim, were reported. Id.
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tional punitive recoveries.0 ' For example, Massachusetts and
Michigan each reported twelve libel cases since 1980.203 In compar-
ison, the survey listed only six states with more than twelve libel
cases during the years covered.2" ' Although the survey showed only
one or two libel cases brought in four of the states that disallow
punitive damages, 05 twelve states that permit exemplary recovery
also had two or fewer defamation actions brought during the same
time period.20 6 Based on these figures, the availability of punitive
damages does not appear to be a determinative factor with regard
to the continued vitality of the libel tort. 07
Second, data collected by the ILRP refute the notion that with-
out punitive damages, public libel plaintiffs will not find attorneys
willing to represent them on a contingent fee basis. According to
that study, public plaintiffs-those who must prove actual malice
and whose chances of victory are therefore reduced-are most
likely to be represented pursuant to a contingency arrangement,
while private plaintiffs most often shoulder their own litigation ex-
penses. 08 This anomalous result highlights the importance of libel
lawyers' non-award stakes, which affect the availability of legal
representation in defamation cases. By representing a public offi-
cial or public figure in a high-profile defamation suit, the plaintiff's
lawyer attracts significant media attention. ' The publicity at-
tendant to a media defamation case, comparable to lawyer adver-
tising without the stigma, makes it worth the attorney's time to
accept such a case on contingency, even if it does not promise
much chance of recovery.1 0 Additionally, a lawyer who represents
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. The states and the number of libel cases in each were as follows: New York,
20; Pennsylvania, 19; California, 18; Florida and Texas, 16 each; and Ohio, 13. Twelve libel
cases were also listed for Illinois.
205. Id. The states and the number of libel cases in each were as follows: Connecticut
and Nebraska, one each; and New Hampshire and Washington, two each.
206. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, cited at note 8, at Al-B8. These states were Indiana
and Vermont, each of which reported two libel cases; Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Utah, and
Wyoming, each of which reported one libel case; and Idaho, North Carolina, North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin, none of which reported a libel case during the period covered.
207. Id. The remaining states and the number of libel cases brought in each as follows:
Virginia, 11; Missouri, 8; Mississippi, Georgia, and South Carolina, 7 each; Rhode Island, 6;
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, New Jersey, and West Virginia, 5 each;
Alabama, Arizona, Kentucky, New Mexico, and Maryland, 4 each; and Maine, Minnesota,
Nevada, and Oklahoma, 3 each.
208. Bezanson et al., cited at note 11, at 34.
209. Id. at 34.
210. Cass, cited at note 165, at 83.
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a public figure may fear losing an influential client should the at-
torney refuse to accept the client's defamation case.21
Finally, it should be noted that most plaintiffs bear significantly
less expense in bringing libel suits than do the media in defending
them. The ILRP found that total litigation costs of libel plaintiffs
averaged less than $10,000, with most suits requiring an expendi-
ture of less than $5,000.212 Because approximately three-quarters
of defamation actions are resolved before trial, many plaintiffs'
cases involve little more than the filing of a complaint.213
Of course, some celebrity libel plaintiffs have incurred much
greater litigation expenses, including General William Westmore-
land and entertainer Wayne Newton, in their respective libel suits
against network television." 4 However, it seems unrealistic to posit
that these high profile plaintiffs would be unable to attract attor-
neys to take their cases if punitive recoveries became unavailable.
The better known the defamation plaintiff, the more tempting the
nonaward stakes become for the plaintiff's counsel. Because attor-
neys would continue to represent public plaintiffs for nonfinancial
reasons and because the cost of suing for libel in most cases would
remain relatively inexpensive, the elimination of punitive damages
should have little impact on the ability or desire of public plaintiffs
to pursue defamation litigation.
E. Punitive Damages Create a Costly and Unnecessary Drain on
Judicial Resources
Abolishing punitive damages in public plaintiff libel cases would
be unlikely to reduce the number of defamation actions that are
initiated because public plaintiffs generally sue for nonfinancial
reasons."' However, eliminating punitive recoveries would help
make damage awards more realistic, which could limit the number
of costly post-trial motions and appeals that are currently made as
211. Mark S. Nadel, Refining the Doctrine of New York Times v. Sullivan, in THE
COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, cited at note 4, 157, at 165.
212. Bezanson et al., cited at note 8, at 34. Libel defendants, on the other hand, may
spend as much as $150,000. See text accompanying notes 124-25.
213. Id. But see, Anderson, cited at note 3, at 542 (for well-known public figure plain-
tiffs, libel expenses may exceed $1 million).
214. Bezanson, cited at note 11, at 34. In a libel suit against a Dallas television station
where the jury awarded a record $58 million to a former county attorney, Vic Feazell,
Feazell's attorney said the plaintiff's costs totaled $106,000. Gordon Hunter, How Belo Set-
tled Last of the Red-Hot Libel Wars, TEX. LAW., Oct. 4, 1993 at 1, 28, col. 2.
215. See text accompanying notes 187-211.
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a matter of course in defamation litigation." 6
According to LDRC statistics for communication tort cases
brought from 1980 to 1990, approximately fifty-seven percent\of all
jury verdicts included a punitive portion, which averaged 'more
than $1.5 million." 7 However, almost twenty-nine percent of initial
jury awards were overturned or modified for the defendant at the
post-trial motion stage. 1 8 In about ten percent of these cases,
judgments notwithstanding the verdicts were granted. 19 Almost
seventeen percent of jury awards were reduced by the trial judge,
and motions for new trials were granted in almost two per cent of
the cases. '
The survey goes on to show that more than half of the libel ver-
dicts that survived the post-trial motion stage were reversed on ap-
peal.' For those not overturned, damages were subsequently re-
duced or further reduced in another seventeen percent of the
cases.' The end result: less than twenty-five percent of the initial
awards were affirmed as entered, while more than seventy-five per-
cent were modified in the libel defendant's favor. ' Although the
average award actually paid totaled more than a quarter of a mil-
lion dollars, less than ten percent of the money initially awarded
was ultimately paid. 2 4
These figures reveal a libel system where large verdicts are
granted, only to be reversed or reduced on appeal. If punitive dam-
ages were eliminated in public plaintiff cases, initial damage
awards would be lower and accordingly, would need less post-trial
adjustment. Even a small reduction in the current drain on judicial
resources created from endless defamation appeals would achieve a
significant social good.
According to a 1992 report of the American Bar Association's
special committee on funding the justice system, both federal and
state judicial systems are overloaded to the point that the quality
216. But see, Barron, cited at note 14, at 112 (punitive damages spur litigation that
otherwise might not occur, providing a voice to those victimized by the media).
217. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, cited at note 8, at 3. Approximately one-third of bench





222. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, cited at note 8, at 3.




and availability of justice are threatened. 25 The report noted that
the federal judiciary has endured a budget crisis for the past three
years and that about fifty percent of the states have had to reduce
funds allocated to their court systems s.22 The fact that many of our
judges face overwhelming caseloads is well known.227 The judicial
time and energy spent reversing, modifying and reducing exorbi-
tant punitive damage awards in defamation cases could no doubt
be put to a more socially preferable use.
However, it has been argued that even if punitive damages are
done away with in public plaintiff cases, juries could continue to
punish libel defendants by increasing compensatory awards to pu-
nitive heights.22 8 Because judges and juries are allowed to presume
that the plaintiff suffered injury merely from the defendant's pub-
lication of defamatory statements, damages may be assessed with-
out proof of out-of-pocket loss. 2 e Although libel plaintiffs who are
defamed in connection with matters of public interest must prove
actual malice if they cannot provide evidence of actual injury, ac-
tual injury can be established by a showing of emotional suffering
and humiliation.2 30 As Professor Anderson has noted, most libel
plaintiffs allege an abundance of mental distress,3 , tempting the
trier of fact to grant compensation for emotional suffering greatly
in excess of any real pecuniary loss.
One frequently proposed way to curb the unlimited ability of
judges and juries to award exorbitant compensatory damages is to
eliminate presumed damages in libel law. 2 Some who have sug-
gested barring presumed damages would continue to grant recov-
ery for nonpecuniary reputational harm, but not for mental suffer-
ing,233 while others would permit recovery for emotional harm if
supported by sufficient evidence. 234 Despite the obvious appeal of
this solution, it gives no consideration to the inevitable difficulties




228. See, e.g., Barron, cited at note 14, at 115-16; Jollymore, cited at note 13, at 1425.
229. SMOLLA, cited at note 67, at § 9.05[1].
230. Id. at § 9.06[5][b].
231. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 524.
232. See e.g., David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 747, 749-56 (1984); Halpern, cited at note 3, at 244-45; Anthony Lewis, New
York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 83 COLuM, L. REv. 603, 615-17 (1983).
233. Anderson, cited at note 232, at 749.
234. Halpern, cited at note 3, at 245.
Vol. 32:667
Punitive Damages in Libel Actions
plaintiffs would have in proving all reputational injuries. Presumed
damages may be necessary in certain defamation actions because
"it is quite often impossible to reconstruct the ever-expanding web
of influence that false statements can spin.''2 5
For this reason, perhaps the best alternative would be to permit
presumed damages in libel actions, but cap them at a judicially or
legislatively determined amount.236 Damage limits have become
quite common in state law, especially in wrongful death actions
and with respect to punitive awards.2 37 Although some states have
limited punitive awards in specific causes of actions, many of these
existing statutes do not apply in defamation cases. 38
If punitive damages were outlawed in public plaintiff libel cases
and a ceiling was placed on recoverable presumed damages, it has
been objected that plaintiffs could still recover gigantic punitive
verdicts by recasting their suits as invasion of privacy or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims.23 9 However, this di-
lemma has been previously raised and solved in libel law, when the
Sullivan case imposed the actual malice standard in public plain-
tiff libel cases. Following that decision, the Supreme Court ruled
that plaintiffs in communication tort cases cannot avoid the fault
requirement by bringing either false light privacy actions240 or ac-
tions for intentional infliction of emotional distress where defama-
tory statements are at issue.241 This circumvention problem with
respect to punitive damages can be addressed in the same way: in
any communication tort case where a fault requirement exists, pu-
nitive damages must be disallowed. So, for example, punitive dam-
ages would be recoverable in a public plaintiff appropriation of
235. Epstein, cited at note 3, at 793.
236. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 242 (1986). Professor Smolla has suggested
$500,000. Another possibility would be to use a combination of a flat rate and a multiple of
compensatory damages. For example, presumed damages would not exceed $500,000 or
three times compensatory damages, whichever is greater.
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West Supp. 1993), which
provides that the statute limiting exemplary damages to four times the amount of actual
damages or $200,000, whichever is greater, does not apply to damages resulting from a mali-
cious or an intentional tort; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (Michie Supp. 1993), which es-
tablishes a limitation on punitive awards of three times the compensatory damages or
$300,000, whichever is greater, but does not apply to defamation actions. For a discussion of
various state legislative statutes limiting punitive damages, see Volz & Fayz, cited at note
31.
239. See Van Alstyne, cited at note 13, at 809-10. Professor Van Alstyne has called
this the "problem of circumvention." Id.
240. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386-88 (1967).
241. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
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identity for commercial purposes case, but not in a false light inva-
sion of privacy action. 42 Misappropriation, intrusion, and publica-
tion of private facts privacy claims do not involve publications of
defamatory falsehoods, and therefore do not raise the same First
Amendment concerns regarding the chilling effect of punitive
awards.
V. REMAINING ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF PUNITIVE AWARDS IN
DEFAMATION ACTIONS
Most of the arguments for retaining exemplary damages in pub-
lic plaintiff libel cases have been addressed and answered in the
preceding section of this article as the flip side to the reasons for
eliminating such awards. These included discussions concerning
the existence of the chilling effect of punitive verdicts on protected
speech,243 and whether punitive awards serve to deter and punish
reprehensible conduct,244 or to protect reputational interests.
245
However, several additional assertions regarding the appropriate-
ness of punitive damages in defamation actions also merit consid-
eration. These arguments contend that punitive damages are
needed in libel law to preserve media accountability; that punitive
damages serve to recompense successful plaintiffs for attorney's
fees; and that punitive awards are justified in certain cases where
the media act with specific intent to injure. Additionally, this sec-
tion considers whether removing damage issues from the jury in
libel cases would redress the problem of excessive punitive awards.
A. Punitive Damages Encourage Media Accountability
Advocates of punitive damages in libel litigation have argued
that the threat of large exemplary awards is needed to ensure me-
dia responsibility.2 46 According to this position, any limitations on
recoverable damages in libel actions would create lower press accu-
racy, resulting in increased reputational injuries.24 The elimina-
tion of punitive damages would further infuriate jurors who al-
242. Cf. Committee on Communications Law, cited at note 122, at 23, n.10 (where the
committee recommended abolishing punitive damages in all invasion of privacy cases, in-
cluding misappropriation, intrusion, publication of private facts, and false light privacy
claims, as well as in libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress actions).
243. See text accompanying notes 116-143.
244. See text accompanying notes 154-182.
245. See text accompanying notes 183-213.
246. See, e.g., Barron, cited at note 14, at 113.
247. See Hollander, cited at note 150, at 268, 270.
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ready view the press as thoughtless and overpowerful.248 This point
of view reflects a general attitude of some that the press has be-
come irresponsible since, and perhaps because of, the change in
libel liability rules brought about by Sullivan and its progeny. 4
But the conclusion that punitive damages are all that stands be-
tween the press and total irresponsibility relies on a number of in-
supportable assumptions. First, it presumes that the media as a
whole are motivated entirely from fear of monetary judgments,
without any desire for professionalism or quality reporting. How-
ever, the media apparently care enough about their reputation for
accuracy to pay a high price to defend libel suits.2 50 The ILRP
found that settlements are scarce in defamation cases, with only
about twenty-five percent of libel suits being settled,251 compared
with a fifty percent overall settlement rate in tort cases gener-
ally.2"' The insistence on defending practically every libel claim ev-
idences the high priority most media outlets place on credibility.25
Furthermore, several states already disallow punitive recoveries in
defamation actions, 54 and no evidence exists that the press is more
villainous in those states than it is elsewhere. 55
Second, the idea that punitive awards keep the press responsible
ignores the function and purpose of the fault requirement in libel
law. As noted by Professor Cass, before the Sullivan case, if a de-
fendant suffered an adverse libel judgment it meant that a false
statement had slipped into the paper.25 After Sullivan, an adverse
ruling now indicates that the defendant published the false state-
ment with a certain level of culpability.257 A post-Sullivan deter-
mination of recklessness implicates the defendant's credibility and
threatens the defendant's relationships with its consumers, work-
ers, and sources .21 For this reason, the fault requirement in libel
law should encourage press accountability with or without the ad-
dition of punitive damages.
248. Barron, cited at note 14, at 114-15.
249. See, e.g., James P. Cain, Protect Us From a Reckless Press, 71 A.B.A. J., July
1985, at 38, 41.
250. See text accompanying notes 123-126.
251. Bezanson et al, cited at note 11, at 34.
252. Hollander, cited at note 150, at 267.
253. Bezanson et al., cited at note 11, at 22.
254. See text accompanying notes 200-207.
255. SMOLLA, cited at note 236, at 242.
256. Cass, cited at note 165, at 77.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 76. Also see text accompanying notes 165-167.
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Even if it could be shown that the media has become less con-
cerned with accuracy since the Sullivan case was decided in 1964,
the problem should then be addressed by rethinking liability stan-
dards, rather than by imposing an award of exorbitant punitive
damages. Several scholars have advocated relinquishing the actual
malice rule and either returning to strict liability,259 or replacing it
with some type of "professional negligence" standard. 80 However,
before a different liability standard can be considered, it must be
empirically established that lower levels of accuracy are a result of
the actual malice rule, and not the unavoidable consequence of
other transformations in the media since the 1960s, such as tighter
deadlines, increased competition, and new media technology.
Would raising the standard of care expected of the media result in
more accurate reporting, or simply less reported information? The
relationship between liability standards and self censorship is ad-
mittedly hard to evaluate, but the First Amendment requires that
any change in liability must promote higher media precision with-
out creating intolerable burdens on expression."'
B. Punitive Damages Recompense Successful Plaintiffs for At-
torney's Fees
Compensatory damages in our legal system generally do not re-
imburse successful plaintiffs for attorney's fees. Should the plain-
tiff be victorious, the plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by the
amount of legal fees incurred. Therefore, it has been suggested
that punitive damages are needed in libel actions to make prevail-
ing plaintiffs whole in this regard. 2
However, rather than justify punitive damages on this shaky
ground, a more satisfactory approach would be to change the rules
regarding compensatory damages to include recovery for legal
fees. 63 Certainly, a recovery for litigation expenses is intended to
compensate the plaintiff, rather than punish the defendant. Fur-
259. See, e.g., Epstein, cited at note 3, at 802.
260. See, e.g., Halpern, cited at note 3, at 250; Hollander, cited at note 150, at 275.
261. See text accompanying notes 141-143.
262. Jollymore, cited at note 13, at 1400. For a discussion of the English "loser pays"
system, see Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, 78 A.B.A. J., November 1992, at 54; The-
odore R. Tetzlaff, The English Rule from the English Perspective, 18 LITIGATION, Summer
1992, at 1; Allison F. Aranson, Note, The United States Percentage Contingent Fee Sys-
tem: Ridicule and Reform from an International Perspective, 27 TEX INT'L L.J. 755 (1992).
263. This idea has been suggested by several commentators. See, e.g., Jollymore, cited
at note 13, at 1400, Comment, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, cited at note 13, at 849
n.11 (1985); Note, Punitive Damages in Defamation Litigation, cited at note 13, at 615.
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thermore, a judicial or legislative rule granting reasonable attor-
ney's fees to the prevailing party would encourage meritorious law-
suits while discouraging groundless claims.
C. Punitive Damages are Needed to Punish the Press When it
Acts With Specific Intent to Injure
A hard issue remains in determining whether punitive damages
should be allowed in public plaintiff libel cases where the defend-
ant published defamatory falsehoods pursuant to a plan specifi-
cally designed to injure the plaintiff. For example, two weeks
before an election, a West Virginia newspaper published a series of
articles carrying misleading headlines implying that a gubernato-
rial candidate had engaged in shady real estate transactions.2 64 The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that the newspa-
per published the headlines even though it had no evidence of im-
propriety by the candidate.' 5 According to the court, the newspa-
per orchestrated a scheme to discredit the plaintiff's character for
personal motives and had not acted in its capacity as a news-gath-
ering organization.6 6
In this unusual situation, are punitive damages proper when a
defendant repeatedly defames a public official based on a personal
vendetta? When a defendant does engage in such reprehensible
conduct, it becomes difficult to argue that punitive damages are
inappropriate. A solution as suggested by Professor Epstein, as-
suming a return to strict liability, would be to allow punitive dam-
ages when the defendant repeatedly and systematically defames a
public plaintiff after receiving clear and convincing evidence as to
the falsity of the publications.6 7
The alternative would be to forbid punitive recoveries even in
these situations, recognizing that the First Amendment requires
toleration of some reprehensible speech in order to fully safeguard
informative and accurate speech regarding matters of public inter-
est. After all, the plaintiff in this type of case will still be entitled
to full compensation for all pecuniary loss, including some measure
of presumed damages, as well as emotional suffering and personal
humiliation. Assuming that punitive damages are eliminated in
264. Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 680 (W. Va.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 882 (1975).
265. Sprouse, 211 S.E.2d at 688.
266. Id. at 691.
267. Epstein, cited at note 3, at 816.
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public plaintiff libel actions, the problem with providing an excep-
tion for egregious conduct is that juries may abuse it, using the
exception to punish unpopular or unorthodox expression. For ex-
ample, several commentators have advocated conditioning the
award of punitive damages in libel cases on a finding of common
law malice or ill will.26 8 While this rule would appear to create a
meaningful limitation on punitive recoveries, in practice it has not.
Most states do require a finding of ill will or spite; however, juries
imply the existence of common law malice from the same evidence
used to establish actual malice.26 9 It is therefore not unimaginable
that juries may find the existence of a plan to defame in public
plaintiff libel actions as often and as easily as they find the exis-
tence of common law malice. Because of the potential for abuse, it
appears that the better solution would be to simply forbid punitive
recoveries in all public plaintiff defamation cases.
D. Exorbitant Punitive Awards Can Be Eliminated in Libel Ac-
tions by Removing Damage Issues from the Jury
It has been suggested that, rather than eliminate punitive recov-
eries in libel actions, the Supreme Court should simply take dam-
age determinations away from the jury.27° Juries do not fully un-
derstand the complexities and First Amendment implications of
libel law, expecting newspaper publishers to be accountable for the
consequences of false information in the same way that manufac-
turers are required to bear the costs associated with a defective
product.271 Because the actual malice rule focuses on the defend-
ant's conduct rather than on the truth or falsity of the publication,
juries are likely to award punitive damages whenever actual malice
is established.2 72 Judges, it is argued, have the necessary legal ex-
pertise to determine when punitive damages would be appropriate
and in what amounts, without being swayed by irrelevant
factors.
2 73
LDRC statistics for 1980 through 1989 confirm that exemplary
damages are generally awarded less frequently by judges than by
juries, with approximately one-third of bench awards including a
268. See Halpern, cited at note 3, at '249 n. 98; Jollymore, cited at note 13, at 1409;
Comment, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, cited at note 13, at 860.
269. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 514.
270. Id. at 554.
271. Van Alstyne, cited at note 13, at 795; Matheson, cited at note 3, at 281.
272. Epstein, cited at note 3, at 807.
273. Id.
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punitive component, compared with jury awards of punitive in al-
most three out of every five verdicts. 7 " The average punitive bench
award during that time period cannot be fairly contrasted with the
comparable figures for jury awards because one $5 million punitive
bench award distorts the results .276 Although comparisons are of
questionable value when so few libel cases are determined by
bench trial, the study showed that no punitive damages were im-
posed in the three bench trials reported from 1990 to 1991.276
Would the Supreme Court be likely to accept the assumption
that judges are superior to juries in assessing damages in compli-
cated legal matters? Historically, juries have been authorized to
determine even more delicate questions than libel liability, includ-
ing life and death decisions in criminal law. Removing the issue of
damages from the jury in libel actions could open a Pandora's box
of objections to jury damages in antitrust cases and other "com-
plex" areas of the law. Furthermore, the existence of the one $5
million punitive bench award in a libel case mentioned in the
LDRC survey portends that judges may not be superior in assess-
ing realistic damage amounts after all.
More importantly, removing the determination of libel damages
from the jury does not address the underlying concerns regarding
the propriety of punitive damages in public plaintiff libel actions.
Whether they are imposed by judges or juries, punitive awards still
create a chilling effect on protected speech, an opportunity for dis-
crimination against unpopular speakers, and an ineffective and un-
predictable means to vindicate reputational interests. The only
possible justification for eliminating jury-assessed punitive dam-
ages would be that bench awards might reduce the drain on judi-
cial resources by removing the need for post-trial review. While
this alternative might be better than nothing, it clearly fails to ad-
dress most of the problems generated by punitive damage awards
in public plaintiff defamation actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Libel law involves competing interests: the protection of individ-
ual reputations on one hand and the First Amendment freedom to
speak and publish on the other. As Professor Anderson has noted,
the mere existence of defamation law deters speech; the only way
274. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, cited at note 8, at 3.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 5.
1994
Duquesne Law Review
to erase this chilling effect entirely is to do away with the libel
tort.2 77 However, all but First Amendment absolutists admit that
libel law advances a social good by safeguarding reputational inter-
ests. The question presented by this article is whether punitive
damage awards in public official and public figure defamation ac-
tions can similarly be justified.
The Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,278 stated
that libel law serves the underlying state interest of "compensation
of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory false-
hood. ' 27 9 Punitive damages, which reward the plaintiff beyond
compensation for injury ostensibly to punish and deter reprehensi-
ble conduct, are inappropriate when the conduct in question enjoys
significant First Amendment protection. Considering the massive
legal fees necessary to defend against them, exemplary awards cre-
ate a chilling effect that is particularly evident to publications that
are outside the mainstream. The arbitrary and unpredictable man-
ner in which punitive damages generally are awarded in libel cases
provides little guidance to publishers who seek to avoid such liabil-
ity in the future. The easiest way for an editor to protect against
incurring ruinous punitive awards may simply be to refrain from
publishing controversial matters. Ironically, research shows that
public plaintiffs usually engage in libel litigation in order to clear
their names, rather than to recoup windfall punitive verdicts.
The best and most administratively efficient solution to the
problems created by exorbitant libel verdicts would be for the Su-
preme Court to hold that punitive awards in public plaintiff libel
cases violate the First Amendment for the reasons described here.
To avoid the problem of circumvention, the Court should extend
this holding to all communication-related torts where liability is
predicated on a finding of actual malice. Additionally, the Court
should either devise a reasonable limit on presumed damages, or
instruct the states to do so. Otherwise, libel verdicts are likely to
become punitive in substance although compensatory in name.
If the Supreme Court is unwilling to act to eliminate punitive
recoveries in public plaintiff defamation actions, the states should
not hesitate to do so, based on their ability to act under the federal
or state constitutions. Contrary to the fears of some scholars, state
law after Sullivan remains important in media defamation actions
277. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 551.
278. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
279. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
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and especially in the realm of damages.2 80 Some states have al-
ready outlawed or limited punitive damages in libel actions and no
evidence exists to prove that defamation has become a dead letter
or that reputations go unprotected in those, jurisdictions.
281
Many other aspects of libel law have been denounced as ineffi-
cient and counterproductive,282 but so far the calls for reform have
gone unanswered. Perhaps the press would be better served with a
return to strict liability, as Professor Epstein has suggested, 283 and
perhaps the Supreme Court will refashion the libel tort completely,
as Professor Anderson has advocated. 8 4 But while we wait for the
Supreme Court to announce sweeping changes in libel law or for a
uniform defamation statute to be adopted by the states, the prob-
lem of exorbitant punitive damage awards in public plaintiff libel
cases continues to grow. Abolishing punitive damages in public
plaintiff libel actions, combined with reasonable limits on pre-
sumed damages, would alleviate a serious and escalating problem
in libel law and provide impetus for further reform.
280. Marc A. Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 Am. B. FOUND.
RES. J., 795, 831. For example, one libel insurance provider has identified nine states in
which it imposes a double premium for defamation insurance. Id. at 827.
281. See text accompanying notes 200-207, 254-255.
282. For a detailed discussion of the imperfections existent in the current libel law
system, see Anderson, cited at note 3.
283. Epstein, cited at note 3, at 802.
284. Anderson, cited at note 3, at 552.
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